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Abstract
This paper studies the provision of deposit insurance without commitment in an economy with
heterogenous households. When households are identical, deposit insurance will be provided ex post to
reap insurance gains. But the ex post provision of deposit insurance redistributes consumption when
households diﬀer in their claims on the banking system as well as in their tax obligations to ﬁnance the
deposit insurance. Deposit insurance will not be provided ex post if it requires a (socially) undesirable
redistribution of consumption which outweighs insurance gains.
1 Introduction
Within the framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the implications of deposit insurance are well un-
derstood. If agents believe that deposit insurance will be provided, then bank runs, driven by beliefs, will
not occur. In equilibrium, the government need not act: deposit insurance is never provided and costly
liquidations need not occur. Instead, deposit insurance works through its eﬀects on beliefs, supported by
the commitment of a government to its provision.
Yet, recent events during the ﬁnancial crisis leads one to question this commitment of the government. In
many countries, such as the US, the parameters of deposit insurance were adjusted during the crisis period.
In other countries, such as UK, ambiguities about the deposit insurance program contributed to banking
instability. In yet other countries, such as China, the exact nature of deposit insurance is not explicit. And,
in Europe, the combination of a common currency, the commitment of the ECB not to bailout member
governments and ﬁscal restrictions, casts some doubt upon the ability of individual countries to ﬁnance
deposit insurance as needed.
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Finally, in all of these instances, there is also the question of how broadly to deﬁne a bank and thus the
types of ﬁnancial arrangements deposit insurance (in some cases interpretable as an ex post bailout) might
cover.1 The bailout of AIG, for example, along with the choice not to bail-out Lehman Brothers, makes
clear that some form of deposit insurance is possible ex post for some, but not all, ﬁnancial intermediaries.
These events highlight ambiguities about the provision and extent of deposit insurance. This motivates
our study of deposit insurance without commitment to identify conditions under which this insurance will
be provided. A ﬁnding that deposit insurance will be provided ex post establishes a ﬁrmer basis for the
beneﬁts of this insurance. A ﬁnding that deposit insurance will not be provided ex post suggests guidelines
for policy design ex ante to change these ex post incentives.
There are two central building blocks for our analysis. First there is the standard argument about gains
to deposit insurance, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). These are present in the ex post choice of providing
deposit insurance since agents face the risk of obtaining a zero return on deposits in the event of a run.
Second, there are potential costs of redistribution across heterogeneous households that may not be
desired. This depends on the social objective function. These costs of redistribution play a key role in the
Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008) study of bailout of one region by others in a ﬁscal federation. That analysis
highlights two motives for a bailout, the smoothing of consumption and the smoothing of distortionary taxes
across regions.
Here, instead of regions, we consider an economy with heterogeneous households. The central trade-
oﬀ we study is between the insurance gains of deposit insurance and the costs of the redistribution. The
redistribution arises both from the distribution of deposits across heterogeneous households and the tax
obligations needed to ﬁnance deposit insurance. As long as the insurance gains dominate, deposit insurance
will be provided ex post and there is no commitment problem. But, if the deposit insurance entails a
redistribution from relatively poor households to richer households and the social welfare function places
suﬃcient weight on poor households, then deposit insurance will not be provided.
In the bank runs literature following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Ennis and Keister (2009) focus on ex
post interventions in the form of a “deposit freeze” and payment rescheduling. An important feature of that
analysis is the lack of commitment: the decision on the policy intervention arises during the run. Keister
(2010) studies the trade-oﬀ between the ex ante incentive eﬀects and ex post gains to a bailout. Here the
attention is on the design of ex ante measures given the prospect of a bailout ex post.
Neither of those papers focus on the heterogeneity across households and thus the redistributive aspects
of deposit insurance. The redistributive eﬀects of diﬀerent forms of bailouts are surely present in the ongoing
political debate, summarized as “Wall St. vs. Main St.”. These eﬀects are central to the contribution of
this paper.
Our presentation explores the trade-oﬀ between deposit insurance and redistribution. We begin with a
planner’s problem in which the central authority has a suﬃciently rich set of tools to redistribute across
1This was brought out clearly in a presentation, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100924a.
htm , by Ben Bernanke at Princeton University in September 2010.
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agents both ex ante and, in the event of a bank run, ex post as well. If a bank run arises, the planner retakes
control of the allocation process, choosing the allocation of consumption as well as the liquidation of any
long term investments. We ﬁnd that the planner will have an incentive to undertake this reallocation in the
event of a bank run and that, given the prospect of this reallocation, a bank run will never arise.
We then turn to decentralized environments where the capacity for redistribution is progressively limited
so that a trade-oﬀ emerges between redistribution and insurance. Richer households will gain from deposit
insurance simply because of their larger claims on the banking system. Unless these claims are oﬀset by
progressive taxes to fund deposit insurance, the provision of deposit insurance is regressive: transferring
resources from the poor to the rich. If this redistribution runs counter to social welfare, then deposit
insurance may not be provided ex post despite insurance gains.
2 Planner’s Problem
We begin with the planner’s problem to introduce the environment and to make clear conditions under which
there is no tension between insurance and redistribution. The model is a version of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) with heterogeneity across agents. The model is structured to highlight a tension across agents based
upon their claims on the ﬁnancial system. Other diﬀerences across agents, perhaps in terms of the types of
ﬁnancial institutions they have access to, are not part of the focus of the model.
2.1 Environment
There are three periods, with t =0 ,1,2. In periods 0 and 1, each household receives an endowment of the
single good denoted α =( α0, ¯ α). We index households by their period 0 endowment and refer to them as
type α0.L e tf(α0) be the pdf and F(α0) the cdf of the period 0 endowment distribution.
Households consume in either period 1, or in period 2. In the former case, households are called “early”
consumers, in the latter case, “late” consumers. The fraction of early consumers for each type of household
is π.2 The preferences of households are determined at the start of period 1, after any saving decision. The
utility from period 0 consumption is represented by u(c0). Utility in periods 1 and 2 is given by v(cE)i f
the household is an early consumer and by v(cL) if the household is a late consumer. Both u(·) and v(·) are
assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave.
There are two storage technologies available in the economy. There is a one period technology which
generates a unit of the good in period t + 1 from each unit stored in period t. Late households can store
their period 1 endowment using this technology.
There is also a two period technology which yields a return of R>1 in period 2 for each unit stored in
period 0. This technology is illiquid though: it has a return of  <1 if it is interrupted in period 1. The
assumption of  <1 implies that there is a non-trivial choice between investing in the two technologies.
2Here there are two important assumptions. First, π is independent of α0 and second there is no aggregate uncertainty in π.
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2.2 Optimal Allocation
For the planner’s problem, we assume that the household type is observable so that the contract is contingent
on the household’s endowment α0. In contrast, the household’s preferences are not assumed to be observed
by the planner. So, though the contract is dependent upon realized household preferences, the allocation
must be incentive compatible.
The planner chooses the type dependent functions (d(α0),x E(α0),x L(α0)) and the fraction of deposits
to invest in the one period technology, φ, to maximize:

ω(α0)[u(α0 − d(α0)) + πv(¯ α + xE(α0) )+( 1− π)v(¯ α + xL(α0)]f(α0)dα0. (1)
Here the period 0 consumption of the household is its endowment less a deposit, α0 − d(α0). The period
1 consumption for an early consumer is the household’s endowment plus its transfer under the contract,
¯ α + xE(α0). Likewise the period 2 consumption if the household is a late consumer is ¯ α + xL(α0). For late
consumers, the endowment in period 1 is saved to period 2 using the one period technology.





(1 − φ)DR =( 1− π)

xL(α0)f(α0)dα0. (3)
Here φ is the fraction of the overall deposits put into the one-period technology and d(α0) is the “deposit”
of agent of type α0. Total deposits are denoted D =

d(α0)f(α0)dα0. In (1) the welfare weight of a type
α0 agent is ω(α0). The weights sum to one without loss of generality.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to d(α0) for this problem is:
ω(α0)u (α0 − d(α0)) = λ (4)
for all α0 where λ is the multiplier on (2). This condition implies that the marginal utility of period 0
consumption, weighted by ω(α0), is equal across households. Diﬀerence between the consumption allocation
and endowment distribution in period 0 reﬂects redistribution through the tax system across heterogeneous
agents.
The other ﬁrst-order conditions are:
v (¯ α + xE(α0)) = Rv (¯ α + xL(α0)) (5)
and
v (¯ α + xE(α0)) = u (α0 − d(α0)). (6)
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Condition (5) stipulates optimal insurance across being an early and a late consumer. The ﬁnal condition
ties down the intertemporal dimension of the consumption proﬁle. Further, from (5), xE(α0) <x L(α0) and
thus cE(α0) <c L(α0)a sR>1.
As a special case, suppose the weights are independent of the household endowment, i.e. ω(α0)=¯ ω.
Then these conditions imply that the consumption levels of all agents were independent of α0: there would
be complete redistribution along with optimal risk sharing.
2.3 Runs and Deposit Insurance
Despite the presence of a planner, there is still the possibility of “runs”. Since we do not assume that planner
observes the tastes of each household, we implement this allocation through a direct mechanism in which
households announce their taste types to the planner.
In particular, at the start of period 1, after tastes are realized, households announce if they are early or
late consumers. If there are not enough resources available from the liquid technology to meet the demands
of the early consumers, then the planner retakes control of the allocation mechanism deciding whether
to liquidate the long-term investment and how to distribute the existing goods among the claimants. As
discussed in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a key part of deposit insurance is avoiding ineﬃcient liquidation
of long-term illiquid investments. As they put it, “ What is crucial is that deposit insurance frees the asset
liquidation policy from strict dependence on the volume of withdrawals.” Thus it is important that not only
deposit insurance be provided in some form but that liquidation be prevented as well.
In the spirit of sequential service, instead of making announcements about their tastes, households would
instead line up to obtain their promised allocation of xE(α0). Those near the front of the line would be
served, others would not.
One equilibrium is truthtelling which implements the allocation solving (1). Since cL(α0) >c E(α0), late
households have no incentive to claim to be early households as long as all others tell the truth.
But there is the possibility that each household would announce their taste to be “early” consumer, given
that others are doing the same. If so, this is akin to a bank run. Only a fraction of the households who
announced they were early consumers would be served.
If   is suﬃciently close to zero, π<1 implies that there is always a bank run equilibrium. To see this,
note that (2) implies φD <

xE(α0)f(α0)dα0. The left side is the total amount of resources available to
the economy while the right side, which is larger, is the total demands for consumption in period 1 if all
agents announce they are early consumers. Since there are not enough resources to meet the demands of
the households, each would strictly prefer to announce he is an early rather than a late consumer in order
to have a positive probability of obtaining positive consumption.
More generally, regardless of the liquidation value, runs may still occur. Suﬃcient conditions for runs are
discussed in Cooper and Ross (1998). The condition for runs depends jointly on the liquidation value,  , and
the curvature of v(·). From (5), preferences will determine the magnitude of xE(α0) relative to xL(α0) and
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thus the optimal choice of φ. For a given  , a small value of φ, reﬂecting xL(α0) large relative to xE(α0), is
suﬃcient for a bank run.
In the event of a run, let ζ be the probability that a household is able to withdraw xE(α0) from the
intermediation process. We assume ζ is not dependent on the household type. Since the total resources in
the event of a run are φD, then ζ =
φD R
xE(α0)f(α0)dα0. The expected utility of a type α0 household during a
bank run is
ζv(cE(α0) )+( 1− ζ)v(¯ α). (7)
Thus sequential service implies that agents face consumption risk in a bank run with promised consumption
of cE(α0) going to those served while the others consume their period 1 endowment, ¯ α.
When a run is under way, the planner reallocates the resources given the announced taste types of the
households. In this new allocation, the planner will determine the consumption of early consumers and late
consumers based upon their announced types. In addition, the planner can choose to liquidate some of the
two-period investment or save some of the proceeds from the one-period technology to period 2. So this
policy is comprehensive: it gives the planner complete control of the intermediation process.
Proposition 1 Given a bank run, the planner has an incentive to reallocate consumption relative to the
outcome under sequential service.
Proof. The planner chooses the consumption allocations for the early and late households (˜ xE(α0), ˜ xL(α0))





ω(α0)[(1−ν(α0))(1−π)][v(¯ α+˜ xL(α0))]f(α0)dα0 (8)
where ν(α0) is the fraction of type α0 late consumers who announced they were early consumers. The
resource constraint in period 1 is:

[π + ν(α0)(1 − π)]˜ xE(α0)f(α0)dα0 = φD − S +  Z. (9)
The resource constraint in period 2 is
(1 − π)

(1 − ν(α0))˜ xL(α0)f(α0)dα0 =( φD − Z)R + S. (10)
In these constraints, S is additional storage from period 1 to period 2 and Z is the amount of the
two-period investment that is liquidated. Each unit liquidated yields   units in period 1.
It is sub-optimal to get both S>0 and Z>0. Further, as there is a bank run, S>0 is transferring
resources into period 2 when they are needed in period 1. Thus we focus on the case of S = 0 and Z ≥ 0.
If there is any liquidation, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply
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v (¯ α +˜ xE(α0)) =
R
 
v (¯ α +˜ xL(α0)) (11)
and
ω(α0)v (¯ α +˜ xE(α0)) = λE (12)
for all α0 where λE is the multiplier on (9).
Under the alternative allocation of sequential service, agents would face a probability of not being served.
Some agents would receive their promised xE(α0) while others would receive nothing.
Clearly this allocation, summarized by (7), is feasible for the planner ex post but does not solve (8).
Corollary 1 In the allocation characterized in Proposition 1, there is no bank run.
Proof. From (11), ˜ xL(α0) > ˜ xE(α0) since R
  > 1. That is, the consumption of late consumers exceeds
that of the early consumers. Anticipating this reallocation in the event of a run, a late consumer would not
have any incentive to run, regardless of the choices of the other late consumers. Hence there is no bank run:
truthtelling is a dominant strategy.
Together, these results suggest that deposit insurance, in the form of this reallocation, will be provided
without any need of commitment. The planner has both the incentive and the power to reallocate resources
in a response to a run in an optimal fashion. The resulting allocation provides higher consumption for late
consumers and an incentive for them not to run.
3 Decentralization
Instead of the optimal allocation from the planner’s perspective, we can also study the decentralized allocation
through bank contracts. This approach has a couple of advantages. First, it allows us to focus on government
provision of deposit insurance and the related taxation of period 1 endowments independent of period 0
redistribution. This provides some insights into the trade-oﬀ between redistribution and insurance. Second,
we are able to use this structure to look at runs at a subset of banks.
Competitive banks oﬀer contracts to households. Through this competition, the equilibrium outcome
will maximize household utility subject to a zero expected proﬁt constraint. Since household types are
observable, the contracts will be dependent on α0.3
For now, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), assume that neither the bank nor its customers place positive
probability on a bank run. We study the possibility of runs given this optimal contract.
3.1 Household Optimization
Given a contract stipulating a return on deposits in the two periods, (r1(α0),r2(α0)), the type α0 household
chooses its deposit level to solve:
3Later we explore a case with restricted contracts in which private information makes this dependence infeasible.
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maxdu(α0 − d)+πv(¯ α + r1(α0)d)+( 1− π)v(¯ α + r2(α0)d). (13)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the household is
u (α0 − d)=πr1(α0)v (¯ α + r1(α0)d)+( 1− π)r2(α0)v (¯ α + r2(α0)d) (14)
Denote the optimal deposit level as d(α0) and the value of this problem as Uα0(r1(α0),r2(α0)).
3.2 Banks
The bank will choose a contract and an investment plan, (r1(α0),r2(α0),φ(α0)) to maximize household
utility, Uα0(·), subject to a zero expected proﬁt constraint for each type α0. The bank will place a fraction
of deposits, φ(α0) into the liquid storage technology which yields a unit in either period 1 per unit deposited
in period 0. The remainder is deposited into the illiquid technology.
The zero expected proﬁt condition for a type α0 contract is:
r1(α0)πd(α0)+r2(α0)(1 − π)d(α0)=φ(α0)d(α0)+( 1− φ(α0))d(α0)R. (15)
To be sure the bank can meet the needs of customers, the following constraints must hold as well:
φ(α0)d(α0) ≥ r1(α0)d(α0)π and (1 − φ(α0))d(α0)R ≥ r2(α0)(1 − π)d(α0). (16)
Clearly if the two constraints in (16) hold with equality, then the zero expected proﬁt condition is met. Note
that these conditions hold for any level of deposits.
3.3 Decentralized Allocation
The decentralized allocation maximizes Uα0(r1(α0),r2(α0)) subject to (15) and (16) for each α0. The ﬁrst-
order condition implies
v (¯ α + r1(α0)d(α0)) = Rv (¯ α + r2(α0)d(α0)). (17)
In addition, the constraints in (16) are binding so that (15) holds.
Condition (17) is similar to condition (5) from the planner’s problem. Both conditions characterize
optimal insurance across the two preference states for a household of type α0. Of course, the levels of
consumption need not be the same in the two solutions since the planner’s allocation allowed for redistribution
through the choice of d(α0). Importantly, the welfare weights, ω(α0) are not present in the decentralized
allocation.
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4 Systemic Runs and Deposit Insurance
Given that the optimal contract written is without any consideration of bank runs, we ask two questions.4
First, can there be a run without Deposit Insurance (DI)? Second, if so, will the government have an incentive
to provide DI ex post?
In this section, we assume there are runs by all agents on all banks in the system. We refer to this
situation as “systemic runs”. Later, we study the case where there are runs on only a subset of the banks.
4.1 Are there runs?
For this decentralized allocation, if the two period technology is assumed to have essentially no value (  near
zero), a suﬃcient condition for runs is that the amount owed to all agents claiming to be early consumers is
less than the resources available to meet these demands for each α0. This is equivalent to φ(α0) <r 1(α0)
for each α0. Since (16) is binding, π<1 implies φ(α0) <r 1(α0). In contrast to Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
and Cooper and Ross (1998), the condition for runs is simple due to our assumption that the two period
technology has essentially no liquidation value. For  <1 but non-negligible, the conditions for runs are
discussed in Cooper and Ross (1998). Since our focus is on the consequence rather that the conditions for
runs, we focus here on the case of   near zero. We indicate where this assumption is important and then
discuss relaxing it in section 6.
4.2 Deposit Insurance
To study the provision of deposit insurance in the decentralized model, we adopt the same timing in period
1 as described for the implementation of the planner’s solution. The households announce their taste types,
either through direct revelation or by being in line to withdraw. If a bank is unable to meet these claims,
then government assistance through deposit insurance is requested. We study the conditions under which
deposit insurance will be provided.
For the analysis of the government decision to provide deposit insurance, we assume that   is close to zero.
This allows us to focus on the provision of deposit insurance separately from the decision on the liquidation
of the two period technology. With   near zero, the liquidation decision is trivial. We return to this below
when we consider the issue of whether the provision of deposits insurance prevents runs.
Deposit insurance provides to each household its promised return of r1(α0)d(α0) under its deposit con-
tract. This insurance is funded by the levy of a tax, T(α0), on households.
4As in Cooper and Ross (1998), we could also study the choice of a deposit contract given that runs are possible. This is of
interest if the government does not have an incentive to provide deposit insurance.
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4.2.1 Household Period 1 Utility under Deposit Insurance




ω(α0)v(¯ α + χ(α0) − T(α0))f(α0)dα0 (18)
where χ(α0) ≡ r1(α0)d(α0) is the total promised by the bank to an early household of type α0.I f ω(α0)
is a constant, then the objective of the government is just a population weighted average of household
expected utility. In general, the structure of ω(α0) will be relevant for gauging the costs and beneﬁts of the
redistribution associated with DI.
Another key element in the redistribution is the tax system used to pay for DI. In (18), T(α0) is the tax





The left-hand side of this expression is the total tax revenues collected by the government plus the liquid
investment and the right-hand side is the total paid to depositors.5
If, ex post, there is no deposit insurance, then welfare is given by:
WNI =

ω(α0)[ζv(¯ α + χ(α0) )+( 1− ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0. (20)
Here ζ is again the probability a household obtains the full return on its deposit.
The welfare values with and without DI are both calculated at the start of period 1. This is because the
government lacks the ability to commit to DI before agents make their deposit decisions. The government
can only react to an actual bank run in period 1.
4.2.2 Welfare Eﬀects of DI




ω(α0)[v(χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0)) − v(χ(α0)+¯ α − ¯ T)]f(α0)dα0 +

ω(α0)[v(χ(α0)+¯ α − ¯ T) − v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α)]f(α0)d(α0)+

ω(α0)[v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α) − ζv(χ(α0)+¯ α) − (1 − ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0 (21)
where ¯ T =

T(α0)f(α0)dα0.
5If the liquidation value of the illiquid investment was non-trivial, then any liquidated long-term investment would appear
as additional resources on the left-side of the government budget constraint.
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Here there are three terms. The ﬁrst two terms capture the two types of redistribution through deposit
insurance. One eﬀect is through diﬀerences in tax obligations and the other eﬀect comes from diﬀerences in
deposit levels across types. The third term is the insurance eﬀect of deposit insurance.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst term captures the redistribution from taxes. It is the utility diﬀerence between
consumption with deposit insurance and type dependent taxes and consumption with deposit insurance and
type independent taxes, ¯ T.
The second term captures the eﬀects of redistribution through deposit insurance. The term v(χ(α0)+
¯ α− ¯ T)−v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α) is the diﬀerence in utility between the consumption allocation if a type α0 household
gets his promised allocation and bears a tax of ¯ T and the allocation obtained if all households received a
fraction ζ of their promised allocation. This second part is the utility of the expected consumption if there
are runs without deposit insurance.
The third term captures the insurance gains from DI. It is clearly positive if v(c) is strictly concave.
These gains are independent of the shape of ω(α0).
Thus the key trade-oﬀ to the provision of DI ex post is whether the insurance gains dominate the
redistribution eﬀects. Importantly, this trade-oﬀ was not present in the discussion of the planner’s solution.
In that case, the ability of the planner to redistribute across the heterogenous households implied that the
insurance gains from DI were independent of the redistribution. But in this decentralized economy they are
coupled.
Assume there is no heterogeneity across households, so F(α0) is degenerate. In this case, deposit insurance
is valued as it provides risk sharing across households of the uncertainty coming from sequential service.
Proposition 2 If F(α0) is degenerate, v(c) is strictly concave, then the government will have an incentive
to provide deposit insurance.
Proof. In this case, the ﬁrst two terms of (21) are zero. The third term is strictly positive since v(·)i s
strictly concave. Hence Δ > 0.
This is parallel to the standard result in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model although it obtained here
without commitment. It highlights the insurance gain from DI when there are no costs of redistribution.
Here we see that the insurance beneﬁt is enough to motivate the provision of deposit insurance without
commitment.
In our environment of heterogeneous households, this results may also reﬂect the consequence of redis-
tribution across households in period 0. In particular, consider (1) with the restriction of equal welfare
weights across households. When welfare weights are equal across households, the ﬁrst-order conditions for
the planner imply that consumption allocations are equal as well: (c0(α0),c E(α0),c L(α0)) = (c0,c E,c L) for
all α0. Given this equality of consumption allocations, Proposition 2 applies.
Note though that these insurance gains arise without any apparent costs because redistribution occurred
in the initial period. Any heterogeneity across households was oﬀset by taxes and transfers so that, as noted
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earlier, consumption allocations were independent of α0 in the optimal allocation. Hence DI was provided
for insurance reasons alone, as in Proposition 2.
When there is heterogeneity across households, these insurance gains may be oﬀset by redistribution
costs. The next two subsections study these redistribution eﬀects with type dependent taxes. In doing
so, we consider two situations. In the ﬁrst one, the tax system to fund DI is set at the same time the
decision is made to provide DI or not. In this case, there is enough ﬂexibility in the tax system to oﬀset
any redistribution eﬀects of DI. In the second scenario, we take the tax system as given and explore the
incentives to provide DI.
4.3 Taxation ex post: DI Will Be Provided
Consider a government which can choose the tax system used to ﬁnance DI at the same time it is choosing
to provide insurance or not. This can be viewed as the choice of a supplemental tax to fund DI.
In this setting, WDI is the solution to an optimal tax problem:
WDI = maxT(α0)

ω(α0)v(χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0))f(α0)dα0 (22)
subject to a government budget constraint (19). The ﬁrst-order condition implies that ω(α0)v (χ(α0)+¯ α−
T(α0)) independent of α0. This creates a connection between ω(α0)a n dT(α0) which can be used to evaluate
the gains to DI.
Proposition 3 If T(α0) solves the optimization problem (22), then deposit insurance is always provided.
Proof.
Using the ﬁrst-order condition from (22), we rewrite (21) as:
Δ=

[v(χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0)) − v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α)]
v (χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0))
f(α0)d(α0)+

ω(α0)[v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α) − ζv(χ(α0)+¯ α) − (1 − ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0
The second term is positive as argued previously. The ﬁrst term can be shown to be positive as well.
To see this, do a second-order approximation of the second part of the ﬁrst term, v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α), around
the ﬁrst part, v(χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0)). Using the fact that

T(α0)f(α0)dα0 =( 1− ζ)

χ(α0)f(α0)dα0, the
ﬁrst term reduces to

−((1 − ζ)χ(α0) − T(α0))2v  (χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0))
v (χ(α0)+¯ α − T(α0))
f(α0)d(α0) (23)
which is positive as v(·) is strictly concave. Thus Δ > 0.
Why is there always a gain to deposit insurance here? Because with this ex post tax scheme, the current
government can undo any undesirable redistribution coming from DI. Thus the redistribution costs are not
present.
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This result is important for the design of policy. As governments strive to make clear the conditions
under which deposit insurance and other ﬁnancial bailouts will be provided ex post, they ought to articulate
how revenues will be raised to ﬁnance those transfers. If a government says it will not rely on existing tax
structures but instead will, in eﬀect, solve (22), then private agents will know that the government will have
enough ﬂexibility in taxation to overcome any redistributive costs of deposit insurance. This will enhance
the credibility of a promise to provide deposit insurance ex post.
4.4 Taxation ex ante: Will DI Be Provided with Type Independent Taxes?
If the tax system to fund DI is not set ex post, costly redistribution may arise. Then the trade-oﬀ between
insurance gains and redistribution costs emerges. As we shall see, these redistribution eﬀects can be large
enough to oﬀset insurance gains.
To study these issues, we return to (21) which cleanly distinguishes the redistribution and insurance
eﬀects. We start with a case in which taxes are independent of type to gain some understanding of the
trade-oﬀ and then return to the more general case where taxes depend on agent types.
To focus on one dimension of the redistributive nature of deposit insurance, assume that taxes are type
independent: T(α)=¯ T for all α. Under this tax system, (21) simpliﬁes to:
Δ=

ω(α0)[v(χ(α0) − ¯ T +¯ α) − v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α)]f(α0)d(α0)+

ω(α0)[v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α) − ζv(χ(α0)+¯ α) − (1 − ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0. (24)
If taxes are independent of type, then the government budget constraint implies
¯ T =

[χ(α0) − φ(α0)d(α0)]f(α0)dα0. (25)
With type independent taxes, redistribution arises solely from diﬀerences in deposits across types. In
some cases, this redistribution can be costly to society.
Proposition 4 If ω(α0) is weakly decreasing in α0, then the redistribution eﬀect of deposit insurance reduces
social welfare.









¯ T =( 1− ζ)

χ(α)f(α)dα. Letting ˆ c(α0)=ζχ(α0)+¯ α and ¯ c ≡







(ˆ c(α0) − ¯ c)+¯ c) − v(ˆ c(α0))]f(α0)dα0. (26)
The ﬁrst consumption allocation, 1
ζ(ˆ c(α0)−¯ c)+¯ c, is a mean-preserving spread of the second, ˆ c(α0). Both
have the same mean of ¯ c and since 1 >ζthe variance of the ﬁrst consumption allocation is larger. From the
results on mean-preserving spreads, if v(c) is strictly concave
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
[v(χ(α0) − ¯ T +¯ α) − v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α)]f(α0)d(α0) < 0. (27)
Using the fact that the welfare weights integrate to one, we can write the ﬁrst term in (24) as

[v(χ(α0) − ¯ T +¯ α) − v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α)]f(α0)d(α0)+
cov(ω(α0),v(χ(α0) − ¯ T +¯ α) − v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α))). (28)
From the discussion above, the ﬁrst term is negative. If ω(α0) is independent of α0, then the covariance
term in (28) is zero and so (28) is negative. This corresponds to costly redistribution.
If ω(α0) is decreasing in α0, then social welfare puts less than the population weight on high α0 agents.
The diﬀerence, v(χ(α0)− ¯ T+¯ α)−v(ζχ(α0)+¯ α) in (28) is increasing in α0 if χ(α0) is monotonically increasing.
To see that χ(α0) is increasing in α0, the ﬁrst-order condition for the household, (14), can be written as
u (α0 − d(α0)) = πr1v (χ(α0)+¯ α)+( 1− π)r2v (¯ α + r2(α0)d(α0)). (29)
The feasibility constraint for the bank, (16), along with the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal deposit
contract, (17), implies
u (α0 − d(α0)) = v (χ(α0)+¯ α). (30)
From this expression, an increase in α0 will lead to an increase in consumption in both period 0 and in
period 1, for early consumers. For this to be the case, χ(α0) must increase with α0.
As a consequence, the covariance term in (28) is negative. Thus the redistribution eﬀects reduce welfare
if either ω(α0) is either independent of, or decreasing in, α0.
Proposition 4 makes clear that the provision of DI may entail distribution eﬀects that are socially unde-
sirable. There are two key pieces of the argument. First, if welfare weights are type independent, then the
provision of deposit insurance ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax creates a mean preserving spread in consumption.
This is welfare reducing. Second, if welfare weights are decreasing so that the rich are valued less than the
poor in the social welfare function, then the redistribution from poor to rich from the provision of deposit
insurance reduces social welfare further. This second inﬂuence is captured by the covariance term in (28).
This result contrasts with Proposition 2 which eliminates by assumption the redistribution issue and thus
highlights the gains from the provision of deposit insurance. One important factor in the trade-oﬀ between
insurance and redistribution is the underlying distribution of income and thus of deposits. In the following
proposition we look at changes in the distribution of bank deposits, denoted H(χ).
Proposition 5 If v   (·) < 0 and ω(α0) is constant, then Δ is lower when H(·) is replaced by a mean-
preserving spread.
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Proof.
We rewrite (24) to express the gains from deposit insurance using the distribution over claims on the
bank, χ rather than endowments:
˜ Δ=

[v(χ − ¯ T +¯ α) − ζv(χ +¯ α) − (1 − ζ)v(¯ α)]h(χ)dχ (31)
where h(·) is the pdf over bank claims.
If v   (·) < 0, then by diﬀerentiation, v(χ− ¯ T +¯ α)−ζv(χ+¯ α) is strictly concave in χ. Thus if we replace
H(·) with a mean-preserving spread, ˜ Δ will be lower.
These propositions highlight the redistributive eﬀects of deposit insurance. Proposition 4 provides suﬃ-
cient conditions for redistribution to be costly. Proposition 5 makes clear that these losses from redistribution
depend on the distribution of deposits.
Of course, deposit insurance also has an insurance gain, as captured by the second term of (24). These
gains can outweigh the redistribution costs and thus rationalize the provision of deposit insurance ex post.
To gauge the magnitude of this trade-oﬀ, we turn to an example.
4.4.1 Example
Here we consider a speciﬁc example to illustrate conditions for the provision of deposit insurance. Assume
there are two types of households, rich and poor. The rich households have an endowment in youth of
α0 = αr and the poor have an endowment in youth of α0 = αp. Let the fraction of rich households be given
by f. Assume u(c)=c
1−γ0
1−γ0 and that v(c)=β c
1−γ1
1−γ1 . Thus there are two curvature parameters, γ0 and γ1.
Throughout this example, we set γ0 =2 .
To compute an equilibrium, we solve for the optimal contract oﬀered by a bank to a type α0 household.
This involves ﬁnding a level of deposits and interest rates for early and late consumers that satisfy (14),
(16) and (17). We also check that bank investment in each of the two technologies is non-negative and that
interest rates are non-negative as well.
Given the contract, we can evaluate the social gains from deposit insurance by calculating Δ ≡ WDI −
WNI using some welfare weights. Taxes are type independent.
Figures 1 and 2 provide some results. For these ﬁgures, ¯ α =1 ,β =0 .9, R =1 .10 and the fraction of rich
households was set at 50%. The utility diﬀerence from the provision of deposit insurance, Δ, is shown on
the vertical axis.
The eﬀects of variation in risk version, γ1,i nv(·) are shown in Figure 1. Here the initial endowments
were ﬁxed at αp = 3 and αr = 5. The welfare weight for the poor is 0.80, larger than their population share.
For low values of risk aversion, the net gains to the provision of deposit insurance are negative. That
is, the costs of redistribution oﬀset the insurance gains. The utility diﬀerence increases as γ1 increases
and eventually becomes positive. Interestingly, for high enough values of γ1, the utility gains from deposit
insurance again start to fall oﬀ as the costs of redistribution become stronger.
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Figure 1: Eﬀects of Risk Aversion
Figure 2 studies the eﬀects of income distribution on the gains from deposit insurance. On the horizontal
axis is the welfare weight placed on poor households. One curve is the base case and the second, steeper,
curve comes from a mean-preserving spread of endowments such that αp =2 .8 and αr =5 .2. This is the
case labelled “MPS” in the ﬁgure. The curvature of v(·) was set at γ1 =2 .
As is clear from this ﬁgure, the MPS of endowments reduces the gains to DI for all levels of the welfare
weight for the poor below around 20%. The reason is that the spread of the endowments exacerbates the
redistribution costs of the provision of deposit insurance. Only when the poor have a low welfare weight,
does the redistribution in favor of the rich, combined with the provision of insurance, increase social welfare.
After the MPS in endowments, if the weight on the poor exceeds 0.7, then deposit insurance will not be
provided. This compares to a critical weight of about 0.8 in the baseline case.
4.4.2 Restricted Contract
A second way of highlighting the trade-oﬀ between redistribution and insurance is through the outcome
of the model with a restricted contract. In particular, assume that the intermediary is restricted to oﬀer
the same contract to all agents: type dependent returns are not feasible. Further, suppose that a deposit
contract is summarized by a single interest rate, denoted r, which is the annual gross return. So deposits for
one period earn r and deposits for two periods earn r2.
With this simpliﬁed contract we continue to explore the trade-oﬀ between redistribution and insurance.
The analysis of the household and banking problems with this restricted contract are similar to the more
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Figure 2: MPS on Endowment Distribution
general case speciﬁed above.
The deposit of a type α0 household is given by d(r,α0). The deposit is increasing in the endowment α0
and increasing in the deposit return r. Importantly, even if v  (c) = 0, the household will have a well deﬁned
deposit level as long as u  (c) < 0. Thus we can study the special case of risk neutrality in periods 1 and 2
in this model.6
Given the deposit demand functions, a bank will choose a return r and a portfolio to maximize expected
utility of the households subject to zero proﬁt and feasibility constraints. This is analogous to the problem
speciﬁed above, though with a much simpler contract.
Using this model, we return to our discussion of costly redistribution and the risk sharing beneﬁts of
deposit insurance. For the restricted contract, if households are almost risk neutral with respect to variations
in early and late consumption, DI will not be provided ex post if redistribution is costly enough.
Proposition 6 If households are not too risk averse and ω(α0) is strictly decreasing in α0, then a govern-
ment will not have an incentive to provide deposit insurance.
Proof.
With the restricted contract, (24) becomes
6In the previous speciﬁcation where the returns could diﬀer for early and late consumers, at v  (·) = 0, there consumption
for early households went to zero. The restricted contract has the beneﬁt of being better behaved when v(·) is linear.
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Δ=

ω(α0)[v(rd(r,α0) − ¯ T +¯ α) − v(ζrd(r,α0)+¯ α)]f(α0)d(α0)+

ω(α0)[v(ζrd(r,α0)+¯ α) − ζv(rd(r,α0)+¯ α) − (1 − ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0. (32)
Suppose v(·) is linear. Then there are no insurance gains and the second term in (32) is zero, and therefore
Δ=










rd(r,α0)f(α0)dα0 , ¯ T =( 1− ζ)r






ω(α0)[(d(r,α0) − ¯ d(r))]f(α0)d(α0)=
(1 − ζ)r × cov(ω(α0),d(r,α0) − ¯ d(r)) (34)
Since d(r,α0) is increasing in α0 , the provision of deposit insurance redistributes from low to high α0
households. This redistribution reduces social welfare if ω(α0) is strictly decreasing.
If v(·) is close enough to linearity, then the insurance gain from deposit insurance, the second term in
(32) can be made arbitrarily small. Thus the insurance gains are dominated by the costs of redistribution
when ω(α0) is strictly decreasing.
This proposition highlights the redistributive aspect of DI. Since the total resources in the economy are
predetermined and agents are nearly risk neutral, the only role of DI is to redistribute consumption. The
nature of that redistribution depends on the deposits of each type, d(r,α0) and the tax system. The social
value of the redistribution is determined by ω(α0). When this is decreasing, so that the rich households have
a lower weight and households are not very risk averse, then DI will not be provided ex post.
4.5 Taxation ex ante: Will DI Be Provided with Type Dependent Taxes?
The discussion of ex ante taxation has thus far assumed type independent taxes. This allows us to highlight
the eﬀects of the distribution of deposit claims across households which, given type independent taxes,
translates into the distribution of consumption across households.
However, when ex ante taxes are type dependent, then the tax system itself inﬂuences the distribution
of consumption. All else the same, a tax system that redistributes from the poor to the rich will reduce the
desirability of deposit insurance. For this discussion, we assume the welfare weights, ω(α0), are constant to
highlight the eﬀects of T(α0).
Proposition 7 Compare two tax schedules, T(·) and ˜ T(·).I f˜ T(·) induces a MPS on disposable income
relative to T(·) then Δ falls when we replace T(·) with ˜ T(·).
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Proof. Since social welfare is the integral of strictly concave functions, a mean-preserving spread on
disposal income, which is the same as consumption, will reduce social welfare.
To further investigate this issue, following Benabou (2002), consider a tax scheme which maps from
income ϕ to consumption, c(ϕ) according to
c(ϕ)=ϕ1−τ ¯ Tτ.7 (35)





is the cdf of gross income. The constant elasticity of after-tax income (equivalently consumption here) is
simply 1 − τ. The average tax rate,
ϕ−c(ϕ)
ϕ =1− ¯ Tτϕ−τ, is increasing in ϕ if τ>0.
Applying this to our model, the consumption allocation of an agent claiming to be an early consumer is
c(α0)=( ¯ α + χ(α0))(1−τ) ¯ Tτ.H e r e¯ Tτ guarantees that the allocation is feasible.
Proposition 8 Assume consumption allocations are given by (35). Compare two tax rates, τL and τH with
τH >τ L > 0, then Δ is higher under the tax rate τH compared to τL.
Proof.
From Atkinson (1970), social welfare, deﬁned as the integral of an increasing strictly concave function
of individual consumption, is higher for a consumption distribution with a Lorenz curve that lies entirely
above the Lorenz curve for another distribution of consumption. The social welfare associated with the
provision of deposit insurance, (18), satisﬁes these requirements. Hence a distribution of consumption which
Lorenz-dominates another generates higher social welfare.
Kakwani (1977) provides the link between income taxes and the ordering of Lorenz curves. Note that
the elasticity of consumption, c(α0) with respect to ¯ α + χ(α0)i s1− τ. Theorem 1 of Kakwani (1977) is
interpreted in terms of the elasticity of after-tax income with respect to pre-tax income, denoted g(x) in that
theorem. In our application that elasticity is 1 − τ. Hence the elasticity is lower for τH compared to τL.
From Theorem 1 of Kakwani (1977), this implies that the distribution of consumption under the tax rate
τH Lorenz-dominates the distribution of consumption under the tax rate τL. Putting these results together,
social welfare is higher under the tax rate τH than under the tax rate τL.
These results highlight the implications of the tax schedule for the costs of redistribution associated with
the provision of deposit insurance. Essentially, the more progressive is a tax system, the lower are these
redistribution costs and thus the higher is the welfare gain (the lower is the welfare cost) from the provision
of deposit insurance.
5 Partial Bank Runs and Deposit Insurance
Bank runs are not always systemic but instead may impact only a subset of banks. We refer to this situation
as a “partial bank run”. In this section we explore the issue of whether DI will be provided in the event of
7We are grateful to Roland Benabou for discussions on this application and outlining the proof.
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partial bank runs. The fact that runs occur in a subset of banks implies that there is a second dimension for
redistribution: across groups of agents depending on the state of their bank as well as across types of agents
based on their endowments.
Suppose there is a run at a set of banks covering a fraction n households.8 This creates two groups of
agents, one group experiencing a bank run and the other with no run. As before, assume lump-sum taxation
levied on all agents. Then we can write the payoﬀ from DI as:
WDI = n

ω(α0)v(¯ α + χ(α0) − ¯ T)f(α0)dα0 +( 1− n)

ω(α0)v(¯ α + χ(α0) − ¯ T)f(α0)dα0. (36)
The two terms here highlight the two groups of households even though with DI the consumption levels
are the same for each type. If a fraction n of households are involved in a bank run, the lump-sum tax per
household would be given by ¯ T = n

[χ(α0) − φ(α0)d(α0)]f(α0)dα0.
If, ex post, there is no deposit insurance, then social welfare is given by:
WNI = n

ω(α0)[ζv(¯ α + χ(α0) )+( 1− ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0 +( 1− n)

ω(α0)v(¯ α + χ(α0))f(α0)dα0. (37)
The two terms indicate the diﬀerential treatment across groups: in one group, a run creates the uncertainty
from by sequential service while in the other there is ﬁnancial stability.
The key point of the scenario with multiple groups is that the tax paid by depositors in the failed bank
is smaller due to the presence of the other banks because depositors in the other banks pay a share of the
deposit insurance. Whether deposit insurance is then paid ex post depends, in part, on the relative size of
these gains and costs.
In the case of a partial bank run, the net gain to deposit insurance is
Δ=n

ω(α0)[v(cE(α0) − ¯ T) − ζv(¯ α + χ(α0)) − (1 − ζ)v(¯ α)]f(α0)dα0 +
(1 − n)

ω(α0)[v(cE(α0) − ¯ T) − v(cE(α0))]f(α0)dα0. (38)
The following results use this deﬁnition of the welfare diﬀerential.
Drawing upon the arguments in Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008) that consumption smoothing across
regions will lead to bailouts, DI will in fact be provided if the only diﬀerence across households is due to the
status of their bank, that is, whether it is subject to a run or not.
Proposition 9 If F(α0) is degenerate, then the gains from deposit insurance are positive for any n.
Proof. When all households are identical, from (38), the expected utility diﬀerence across regions is given
by:
Δ=[ v(cE − ¯ T) − n[ζv(¯ α + χE)+( 1− ζ)v(¯ α)] − (1 − n)v(cE). (39)
8We do not consider interbank loans since the runs are totally unanticipated and banks are symmetric ex ante and, aside
from the partial run, ex post as well. So if deposit insurance is provided, there is nothing for the banks to trade.
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To see that Δ > 0, combine the second group of terms, subtracted from the ﬁrst term. Since v(·)i s
strictly concave, this combining of terms decreases Δ. Hence we have
Δ > [v(cE − ¯ T) − v(χE(nζ +( 1− n)) + ¯ α). (40)
Using ¯ T = χE(1 − ζ)n and arranging terms,
Δ > [v(cE − ¯ χE(1 − ζ)n) − v(χE(nζ +( 1− n)) + ¯ α). (41)
Since cE = χE +¯ α , the term on the right of (41) is zero implying Δ > 0. This argument holds for any n.
If the distribution of α0 is not degenerate, then the provision of DI entails redistribution in two dimensions:
across groups and across household types. Proposition 9 makes clear that if there is only redistribution across
groups, then DI will be provided. But we know from Proposition 4 that in some cases, the redistribution
across types created by DI may be welfare reducing so that this insurance is not provided.
To better appreciate this trade-oﬀ, we extended the example introduced in section 4.4.1 to allow for runs
at a subset of banks. Recall that in the example taxes were type independent. We used the same parameter
values as earlier with γ0 = γ1 = 2 and the welfare weight of the poor equal to 0.90. Hence, from Figure 1, if
there is a run in all banks, we know that deposit insurance is not welfare improving.
Figure 3 shows the results of our experiment. Along the horizontal axis is the fraction of households
involved in a bank run. If all households are in a run, then there is a social utility loss from deposit
insurance. This utility loss falls as the fraction of household involved in a bank run falls. The utility loss is
zero when the fraction is about 80%. Below that critical value, the utility diﬀerence is positive and hence
deposit insurance will be provided.
Thus this ﬁgure illustrates the trade-oﬀs involved when there are two dimensions of heterogeneity. If
there are runs at all banks, the costly redistribution across income classes outweighs the insurance gains
from deposit insurance. But, if the fraction of banks is suﬃciently small, then the costs of redistribution
across income classes fall relative to the insurance gains across households experiencing runs and those not
experiencing runs.
6 Does Deposit Insurance Eliminate Bank Runs?
The ﬁnal step of the analysis connects the provision of deposit insurance with the elimination of bank runs.
It might seem immediate that once a government has an incentive to provide deposit insurance ex post,
bank runs will be eliminated. But, in fact, this is not the case. Whether the provision of deposit insurance
eliminates bank runs depends upon the liquidation decision of the illiquid investment.
It is possible that the government has an incentive to provide deposit insurance, agents understand this
and yet a bank run occurs. In particular, if the two period technology is completely liquidated in the run,
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Figure 3: Partial Runs
then the provision of deposit insurance may be an optimal way to redistribute the given resources. Yet,
from the standpoint of a late household, the incentive to run remains given the liquidation of the two period
technology.
As long as   exceeds zero, there is a non-trivial liquidation decision to be made. The issue is who makes
that decision: the bank or the government?
6.1 Runs with Deposit Insurance: Costly Bank Liquidations
To start, suppose that a bank is obligated to meet the sequential demands of depositors. In the face of a
run, it will be induced to liquidate the long-term investment. Only when its resources are totally exhausted,
will the provision of deposit insurance be an issue.
Our results indicate that as long as the insurance gains dominate the costly redistribution, deposit
insurance will be provided. Those results were obtained under an assumption of a negligible liquidation
value of long-term investment. As noted above, if   is not negligible, the resources available to redistribute
in the event of a run will be larger. Yet the trade-oﬀ between insurance and redistribution will remain.
More importantly, when the bank is forced to liquidate the long-term investment in the face of a run, the
provision of deposit insurance does not prevent costly liquidation. This has two consequences. First, there is
an ineﬃciency because of the liquidation. Second, the provision of deposit insurance does not prevent runs.
If we think of deposit insurance as a redistribution among agents claiming to be early consumers, then those
claiming to be late consumers will have nothing to consume given the liquidation. Thus it is in their interest
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to misrepresent and claim to be early consumers as well. The bank run is not eliminated.
6.2 Preventing Runs: Comprehensive Deposit Insurance
Alternatively, suppose that it is the authority providing deposit insurance which makes the liquidation
decision. As soon as a bank realizes that a run is underway and prior to liquidation, the authority is given
control over the liquidation decision and the consumption allocations of early and late consumers.
This returns the discussion to Proposition 1. There we characterized the optimal choice of the planner
with regards to both liquidation and redistribution given the announcements of agents. We argued that some
liquidation might occur and that resources would be optimally allocated across early and late consumers.
In this way, deposit insurance is provided to agents claiming to be early and late consumers. Importantly,
bank runs were eliminated as truthtelling is a dominant strategy.
Once we grant the power to decide upon the liquidation of the long-term investment along with the
taxation to scheme to provide deposit insurance, then the regulator and planner’s problems are the same.
To see how this logic applies in the decentralized model, consider again the discussion of ex post optimal
taxation in Section 4.3. There we argued that there exists a tax system which would ﬁnance deposit
insurance and lead to an allocation that improved upon that generated through sequential service when all
agents participated in a bank run.9 If there was some liquidation value to the long-term investment, then the
regulator would jointly determine the amount to be liquidated along with designing the tax system. Since
households value their consumption allocation, a regulator able to design an optimal tax system with full
deposit insurance is able to choose the same allocation as the planner in Proposition 1. And the regulator can
make the same liquidation decision as the planner. Thus in the case of ex post optimal taxation, a promise
to provide deposit insurance is credible, the liquidation decision is optimal and the bank run is eliminated.
In the other cases of ex ante taxation, we argued that deposit insurance would be provided as long as the
redistribution costs were not large enough. If there is some liquidation value to the long-term investment, the
incentive to provide deposit insurance to those claiming to be early consumers will remain. The long-term
investment could be left intact, providing for the consumption of household claiming to be late consumers.
This allocation dominates that provided under sequential service and eliminates the bank run. Of course, the
regulator might improve upon this allocation by solving an optimization problem allowing optimal liquidation
but constrained by the existing tax system.
The regulator’s power to optimally choose liquidation of long-term investment can eliminate bank runs.
However, this requires governments to assume control of troubled banks and thus prevent costly liquidation.
This analysis makes clear that this is an important tool of regulation. Without it, banks may be induced to
undertake costly liquidations despite the provision of deposit insurance.
9If only a fraction of agents participate in the run, the argument again follows that in the proof of Proposition 1.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studies the provision of deposit insurance in the absence of commitment. We interpret deposit
insurance broadly to encompass a variety of forms of ex post bailout of ﬁnancial intermediaries. While steps
taken recently to support the ﬁnancial system in a number of countries may have been warranted, these ex
post interventions have a consequence: agents will now realize that governments will make ex post decisions
on deposit insurance.
If so, it is natural to understand the conditions under which deposit insurance will be supplied ex post.I n
our environment, the planner’s allocation involves both redistribution and the provision of deposit insurance.
But, in decentralized settings in which household diﬀerences appear as diﬀerences in deposit levels, a trade-
oﬀ emerges between risk sharing and the redistribution created by the funding of the transfers inherent in a
deposit insurance system. In some cases, these redistribution costs may be large enough to oﬀset insurance
gains. These costs are reﬂected in the ongoing discussion of bailouts in the U.S. and other countries insofar
as those policies entail a regressive redistribution from Main St. to Wall St.
In the absence of commitment to deposit insurance, the concerns for ﬁnancial stability ﬁrst illustrated
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) resurface. From our analysis, the tax system used to ﬁnance payments
to depositors plays a crucial role in determining whether deposit insurance will be provided. As we have
seen, the claims on the banking system reﬂect the underlying heterogeneity in wealth. Thus the provision
of deposit insurance transfers more to rich than to poor households. If the tax system used to ﬁnance these
transfers is suﬃciently redistributive, then it will reduce the redistribution costs of deposit insurance and is
conducive to the ex post provision of deposit insurance. As we argued in this paper, if the tax system is set
ex post along with deposit insurance, then the government can optimally choose the net transfer and avoid
the conﬂict between insurance and redistribution. But if the deposit insurance must be ﬁnanced by an ex
ante tax system that allows for redistributions from the poor to the rich through the provision of deposit
insurance, then the credibility of deposit insurance is weakened. This was illustrated through our discussion
of lump-sum taxes.
In addition, ex post intervention raises the case of the extent of a bank run: does it cover all banks or
just a subset of them. The latter case opens the possibility of redistribution across groups of depositors, and
thus alters the trade-oﬀ between insurance gains and redistribution costs.
Whether the provision of deposit insurance is enough to prevent runs depends on how comprehensive is
the control of the banks by the regulatory authority. If the banks are prevented from costly liquidation at
the same time the deposit insurance is provided, then the bank runs equilibrium is avoided.
There is another intriguing situation to study the provision of deposit insurance: too big to fail. In that
setting, there is a fundamental heterogeneity across banks. Some are more essential to the ﬁnancial system
than others. It will be of interest to extend this study to allow those asymmetries across ﬁnancial institutions
and understand conditions for deposit insurance in that environment.
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